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1. Introduction 
Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1978 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
China and Russia both changed their planned socialist economies to capitalist market 
economies. Both states realized high economic growth rates during this period. According to 
the World Bank, the Chinese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 70 times higher in 2014 
than in 1978. The Russian GDP grew from 1991 to 2014 to more than 3,5 times the starting 
point (World Bank, 2016). This growth was accompanied by multiple side effects in both 
states, from environmental damage to increased corruption (Huang, 2013; Chrissikos, 2014).  
Another negative effect that occurred in both China and Russia was the increase in income 
inequality. Today, the countries are both among the states with the highest score in the Gini 
index
1
. In 2009, Russia scored 0.4 as China scored 0.42 where other big states as the United 
States scored 0.41 and Germany 0.31 (Quandl, 2015). As economic inequality is a broad 
subject with many causes, I will focus on only one part of economic inequality: interregional 
economic inequality in post-socialist China and Russia. Economic interregional inequality is 
economic inequality between regions, some regions are richer than others. Interregional 
inequality is a problem for China and Russia as civilians in the poorer regions will not accept 
this situation and will demand a bigger share of the national pie, this situation could easily 
lead to conflict and that is something that the leaders in Russia and China want to prevent 
(Remington, 2015, p. 1). Within-regions inequality will be ignored in this research as this 
paper only focuses on interregional inequality.  
Interregional inequality is commonly researched by looking at the Gross Regional Product 
(GRP), and occurs when one region has a higher GRP growth then another. GRP is 
comparable with GDP but is adjusted to a region. To compare bigger and smaller regions, the 
per capita GRP is a more useful tool. An important stream of thinkers within the inequality 
thinkers argues that poor regions will grow towards the rich regions. This process is called 
‘the iron law of convergence’ by the American economist Robert Barro (Barro, 2015; Barro & 
Sala-i-Matin, 1991). To come to this iron law, Barro researched regions in the United States 
                                           
1
 The Gini index is made up by the Italian statistician Gini (1912). It shows the variation in income in a state. 
When a state has a Gini score of 0 there is perfect equality, everybody has the same income. The closer the score 
gets towards 1, the more unequal the income in a state is distributed. The score is based on the ratio given in the 
Lorentz index which maps cumulative share of people with a high income and cumulative share of total earned 
(Ceriani & Verme, 2011).  
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and Western Europe. By comparing the β-convergence for regions Barro found that regional 
GDP tend to grow towards each other with a speed of 2% per year. β-convergence is 
calculated by taking the economic growth that a region makes into account. When the poor 
region X has a higher growth rate than the rich region Y, there is β-convergence (Korotayev, 
Goldstone & Zinkina, 2015).  For regions in poorer countries, Barro argued that “regions will 
have problems with converging if key underlying valuables, such as the quality of human 
capital and institutions are not changed” (Barro, 2015, pp. 911-912). Remington adds to this 
that when “political institutions are weak, the central government will be unable to enforce 
laws uniformly (…) as a result, rates of development would diverge” (Remington, 2015, p. 2). 
1.2 Empirical evidence for regional divergence 
There has been extensive research on Barro’s statement that regions tend to grow towards 
each other. Remington (2011, 2015) is the only author who performed statistical research on 
both China and Russia and there is little evidence that supports Barro’s claim that regions tend 
to grow towards each other in China and Russia. In my literature review it is shown that 
economic interregional inequality can be measured in many different ways, where some 
authors prefer to take the Gini score into account, others prefer the Inter Quartile Range
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(IQR) or other ways to measure interregional inequality. In this overview will be stated which 
methods the authors used to come to their conclusion that interregional inequality increased. 
Most of the measurement methods are focusing on the GRP per capita. Some authors, 
however, chose to pay attention to the wages in a region.  
Remington used official data from the Russia bureau of statistics (Rosstat) and data that was 
estimated by Brandt & Holtz (as the official data from the Chinese government is often seen 
as inflated) to show that in China, among other things, the wages and mean incomes in some 
regions have risen faster than the standard deviations (Remington, 2015, p. 6). This means 
that there are regions that grew economically faster than others. In Russia, the salient factor 
for Remington was the growth in IQR in current prices, which shows that “inter-regional 
inequality has risen with no indication of a reverse trend” (Remington, 2015, p. 6). 
Remington puts more weight on his claim that regions in China and Russia are not converging 
by calculating the previously mentioned β-convergence. Where Barro would have expected to 
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 IQR is a measurement for inequality by dividing the total population (or the regions) into 2 groups. The means 
of the two groups are compared to be a useful tool for showing inequality (Khan Academy, 2015). 
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find a β-convergence in China and Russia, Remington showed that “for both Russia and 
China there is weak evidence of beta convergence (…) and there is no evidence for a long-
term decline in interregional inequality” (Remington, 2015, p. 7).  
Candelaria (2013) used data from the Chinese statistical bureau to find out if there is a 
relation between migration and interregional inequality in China. He found no correlation, but 
he did find evidence that the interregional inequality has been persistent in the last two 
decades and argued that the interregional inequality is not likely to disappear in the near 
future (Candelaria, 2013, p. 15). Candelaria proved this by taking the wage and real wage
3
 
into account. Candelaria concluded from this data that richer regions had a faster growth rate 
in wages than the poorer regions and this caused interregional inequality.  
Kanbur & Zhang (2004) did a survey on 50 years of regional inequality in China. Even 
though their dataset stopped in 2000, they used national and provincial data to map the 
regional Gini index and the general entropy (GE). The GE is a formula created by the 
economist Anthony Shorrocks that takes, next to the Gini score, the population subgroups into 
account (Shorrocks, 1980). In figure 1 the results of their findings are shown. From the 1978 
breakpoint in the data, a clear drop of interregional inequality can be noticed, to be followed 
by a steady increase afterwards. Kanbur and Zhang also noticed that interregional inequality 
went up every time after a big policy shock, for example during the great leap forward or the 
end of socialism (Kanbur & Zhang, 2004).  
 
Figure 1: GINI and GE scores in China. (Kambur & Zhang, 2004, p.8).  
Another research from Kanbur and Zhang (1999) investigated the influence of labor migration 
on interregional inequality. Kanbur and Zhang did not find evidence for this statement but 
when they calculated the Gini score and the GE index from the Chinese Statistical Yearbooks 
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 Real wage is wage adjusted to regional price levels 
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and compared this over a period of ten years, Kanbur and Zhang found that “the overall trend 
in this period has been one of sharply increase regional inequality in China” (Kanbur & 
Zhang, 1999 p. 688-692).  
Zhang (2006) researched the impacts of several policies on one eastern and one western 
province in China. He found that the per capita gross value of industrial and agricultural 
output (GVIAO) in the eastern region was more than 3 times as high as in the western region. 
This led to a situation whereby the eastern region was able to achieve a higher economic 
growth than the western region. It is arguable that this situation occurred nationwide, causing 
interregional inequality.  
In 2011, Remington examined interregional inequality in Russia. In this research, Remington 
used Rosstat data to map the max:min score (the difference between the richest and the 
poorest region), the Coefficient of Variation (CV) that shows sub-national differences from 
the mean and the previously mentioned IQR and Gini score. As shown in table 1, all the four 
factors that show divergence between regions (based on the GRP) increased in the period 
1990-2009. Remington compared the rise in interregional inequality with, among other 
countries, China. When he used provincial yearbooks, he found that in China these four 
factors also increased in the period 1990-2009 (Remington, 2011, p. 14). For China the results 
are shown in table 2.  
 
Table 1: Interregional inequality in regional GDP per capita in Russia (Remington, 2011, p. 
14) 
 
 
Table 2: Interregional inequality in regional GDP per capita in China (Remington, 2011, p. 
14) 
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Bradshaw and Vartapetov (2013) took a range of different factors for interregional inequality 
in account (economic and social). One of the factors Bradshaw and Vartapetov considered 
was the per capita GRP. They mapped the per capita GRP for Russian federations in the 
period  1990-2001 and found that “a number of wealthy regions were able to improve their 
relative position significantly, while the rest of the country lagged behind” (Bradshaw and 
Vartapetov, 2013, p. 408-409). Even when Bradshaw and Vartapetov excluded the three 
richest regions in Russia (Moscow, Tyumen and Ingushetia) there is little evidence for a 
regional convergence between regions, based on the CV.  
 
2. Methodology 
In this research, I will investigate two possible factors that influenced the increase in 
interregional inequality in Russia and China. I selected these two states for three reasons:  
- Both Russia and China are known for their high economic inequality.  
- Russia and China recently changed their economies from socialist to capitalist. 
This process created a unique opportunity to research their change in fiscal policies as 
both states had to come up with a complete new fiscal system.            -  
- Both states have a large surface area. The relative seize of the countries made it 
necessary to decentralize some powers to sub-national governments. In Russia this 
was done to the 83 federations (89 in 1993 but there were some mergers) (Bradshaw 
2006). In China there are no federations but the 31 provinces behave like fiscal 
federations (National bureau of statistics of China, 2014).  
As interregional inequality is a subject that can have many possible explanations, I chose two 
factors that are relevant for China and Russia: fiscal decentralization and fiscal transfers. As it 
was impossible to get access to valid data from the Chinese and Russia government, I will use 
researches, books and data collected by other authors on fiscal decentralization and fiscal 
transfers in general and applied to China or Russia to answer the main question: “How did 
fiscal decentralization and fiscal transfers affect interregional inequality in China and Russia 
after opening up?”.  
After a literature review, there will be two chapters focusing on this main question. The first 
chapter focuses on the hypothesis ‘Fiscal decentralization caused interregional inequality to 
grow in both China and Russia after opening up’. In this chapter I will give a theoretical 
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framework of fiscal decentralization, based on work of Treisman (2002). Later, I will present 
trends in fiscal decentralization in China and Russia based on previous literature on this 
subject. To conclude the chapter, I will summarize researches that show that fiscal 
decentralization caused interregional inequality to grow and give arguments that are specific 
for China and Russia for why fiscal decentralization in these two states caused an increase in 
interregional inequality 
The next chapter will focus on the hypothesis ‘Fiscal transfers in China and Russia after 
opening up did not cause interregional economic convergence’. This chapter will be built up 
the same way as the previous chapter. After giving an explanation of what fiscal transfers are 
(based on literature by Bird and Smart, 2002), I will use researches done by other authors to 
show that fiscal transfers became more important in China and Russia. To conclude this 
chapter, I will show that fiscal transfers did not work equalizing in China and Russia and give 
arguments why fiscal transfers were not equalizing factors.  
This paper will be closed with a discussion and conclusion. In the discussion I will give the 
strengths and weaknesses. In the conclusion there will be an answer to the main question and I 
will give the most important findings of the paper.  
3. Recent research on interregional inequality in China and Russia 
There are numerous other studies that have focused on interregional inequality in China and 
Russia after their opening up. Where this study will focus on two possible explanations that 
prevented convergence, recent studies took another approach. Apart from Remington, other 
authors focused only on one of the two states. After a statistical research on interregional 
inequality each author gave one or two possible explanations for the increase in inequality 
without a further analysis on these explanations. In this research overview I will show the 
most important ideas on what caused interregional inequality in China and Russia. In this 
review, it can be seen that intensive research is already done on possible causes but there is 
hardly any research done on institutional factors that are relevant for both states.  
Remington argued in his 2015 article that the main reason for the lack of convergence in 
China and Russia are existing legacies from the socialist eras in the both countries. In his 
article he focused on socialist legacies as the tax system (that is still partially intact), 
membership to trade unions and political participation.   
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Sun (2013) Wei and Fan (2000) and Fan, Kanbur & Zhang (2008) argued that the main reason 
for the increase in interregional inequality in China was the government’s decision to instate 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) during the transition process. These SEZs were attractive for 
foreign investments as in these SEZs there were favorable tax rates for foreign companies 
(Naughton, 2007). Provinces that had SEZs realized a higher economic growth than provinces 
without SEZs. Yao and Zhang (2001) continued on SEZs by stating that they expected to see 
spillover effects in economical performance from the SEZs to less developed regions but these 
spillover effects, however, did not take place so far.  
Zhang, Xing, Fan & Luo (2007) argued that another cause for interregional inequality could 
be the fact that the Chinese government or State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are the owner of 
the ground in China. They argued that in China most provinces without natural recourses are 
better off than provinces with natural resources. Not only do most gains go to the government 
or the SOEs, the prices for food and other products tend to go up as there is an increase in the 
demand for non-traded goods (Zhang, Xing, Fan & Luo, 2007, p. 17-18).  
Jian, Sachs & Warner (1996) argued that interregional inequality increased because of 
increased horizontal mobility. Even though there were hukou restrictions
4
, Chinese people 
traveled to better off places to work, leaving their former provinces with fewer workers. 
Fewer workers in a regions led to a decline of GRP.  
Another institutional factor was geographical allocation of heavy industry during the socialist 
era in China. Almost all heavy industry was located in the North-East of the country 
(Naughton, 2007, p. 66).  After the opening up, the regions that had to rely on heavy industry 
were not able to follow the rest of the country’s growth. This caused high unemployment and 
distressed towns in some regions. The contrast between these  poor and other richer regions 
caused a growth in interregional inequality (World Bank, 2005).   
Buccellato & Mickiewicz (2009), Hahn (2005) and Bradshaw (2006) argued that the revenues 
that some Russian federations earned from oil and gas production were the most important 
factor for an increase in interregional inequality. Federations with these natural resources 
showed a higher economic growth rate. Fedorov (2002) claimed that it was not only the 
resources that a federation had but also the transportation possibilities. Some federations 
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 The hukou system made it harder for Chinese people to move to another place. People with a rural hukou were 
only able to receive social benefits in their own region (Cheng & Selden, 1994).  
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inherited a better infrastructure of railways and roads from the socialist period which caused 
them to do better trade with the rest of the country and led to a higher GRP. Fedorov also 
found that federations with a bigger capital city had better roads, so he argued that the size of 
the capital city correlated with the economic growth of a federation.  
Dolinskaya (2002) found in a survey for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that not only 
natural resources were of importance for increased interregional inequality in Russia but also 
the composition of industry in a federation. She argued that “the less successful regions were 
trapped at relatively low income levels due to uncompetitive industries” (Dolinskaya, 2002, p. 
27). The lack of competitive industries in a federation is a legacy from the Soviet era when in 
the planned economy every region was assigned to produce a part of the supply chain.  
Ahrend (2005) investigated federation-specific political institutions to explain the lack of 
regional economic convergence in Russia. He found that geographical factors play an 
important role in the lack of economic convergence. The expected political variables (in 
example the governors political preference) did not affect the federation’s economic 
performance (Ahrend, 2005, p. 311). 
Another explanation given for the divergence of Russian federations is given by Remington in 
his 2011 book. Remington searched for a correlation between the regime in a federation and 
intraregional inequality. He found that on the one hand, in the more democratic federations 
there is more within inequality. On the other hand, in the democratic regions, the government 
had closer ties with companies, which resulted in a better economic performance (Remington, 
2011b). For the interregional aspect it is arguable that within-federation democracy can be 
seen as an important factor as federations with more democracy had a higher economic 
growth rate, causing a better economic performance than federations that had less democracy.  
4. Results 
4.1 Fiscal decentralization 
Within the traditional literature for decentralization there are three important streams:  
- Efficiency theory 
- Decentralization theorem  
- Leviathan hypothesis (Porcelli, 2009).   
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The efficiency theory is formulated by Tiebout (1956). He argued that there should be 
decentralization as local governments know best what the people need in their region. Oates 
(1972) came up with the decentralization theorem. He argued that when there are little 
differences in preferences between regions, there should be a tendency towards more 
centralization. However, when the preferences differ between the regions and there are few 
spillover effects from centralization, there should be more decentralization. Oates argued that 
the main goal of the government is to maximize social welfare (Oates, 1972). Another 
argument for decentralization comes from Brennan and Buchanan (1980). They did not see 
the government as a good thing but rather as a leviathan. In their Leviathan Hypothesis they 
claimed that the influence of this evil central governments should be as small as possible so 
there is more power in the hands of local governments.  
As in this paper the focus will be on fiscal decentralization, it is important to get a clear 
definition. The definition which will be used in this paper is one given by Treisman (2002). 
Treisman stated that “fiscal decentralization concerns the way tax revenues and public 
expenditures are distributed among the different tiers. Tax revenue decentralization is 
greater, the larger the share of total tax revenues the subnational tiers recieve” (Treisman, 
2002, pp. 11-12). Treisman argued that the way to measure this decentralization is by looking 
at the “share of subnational governments in total tax revenues or public expenditures” 
(Treisman, 2002, p. 14).  
4.1.1 Trends in fiscal decentralization in Russia 
In the period 1991-2000, Russia shifted from a highly centralized socialist state towards a 
decentralized federal state. The main reason for this is often argued to be the Russian leader, 
Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin was president of the Russian Federation between 1991 and 1999. 
Yeltsin gave federations more power to ensure himself of their support. However, Yeltsin did 
not take the economic implications of decentralization into account (Zhuravskaya, 2010, pp. 
59 - 63). The trends in fiscal decentralization in Russia are described below. In this chapter it 
can be seen that authors used different methods to determine the amount of fiscal 
decentralization. Some authors looked at the share of local expenditure and revenues in the 
central government’s budget whereas others looked at the relative increase of sub-national 
revenues and expenditures. The different methods occur in the China case study as well.  
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Andreeva and Golovanova (2003) argued that fiscal decentralization in Russia was a 
spontaneous process that lacked a clearly defined strategy, giving local authorities the right to 
independently plan their budgets (Andreeva & Golavanova, 2003 p. 2). They base their 
argument that Russia is a decentralized state in the 1990’s on data from the Russian 
government to show that the central government in Russia was accountable for approximately 
55% of the budgetary system expenditures where sub-national governments were accountable 
for the other 45%. Andreeva and Golovanova performed a survey on the percentage of fiscal 
decentralization in Russia as well. They found in a 4-year study on the expenditure ratio in 
Russia that there was a decline in sub-national spending in 2000 but rose steadily back to the 
level of the year before (Andreeva & Golavanova, 2003 pp. 7-8).  
Lavrov, Litwack and Sutherland (2000) did a survey on how the regional revenues were 
composed. They found that in the period 1997-2000, the share of regional tax collection in the 
regional budget shifted from 69% to 76%. This increase is an indicator for the fact that the 
regional governments were given a bigger role in tax collection. This argument is supported 
by a survey by Norris, Vazquez & Norregaard (2000). They stated that “In Russia (…) there 
has been a steady increase in the importance of ‘own-revenues’ in sub-national budgets. 
Own-revenues increased from 13.5% of sub national revenues in 1992 to over 45% in 1998” 
(Norris, Vazquez & Norregaard, 2000).  
However, since the end of the 1990s, a shift in Russia’s fiscal policy can be seen. Figure 2 
shows the percentage of revenues gained by sub national governments without extra 
budgetary funds included (these funds will be discussed in the next chapter). In this table, 
there can be seen a clear shift after 1998 in sub-national revenues. The share of sub-
governmental revenues falls from 55% to 35% in the period 1998-2006 (De Silva, 
Kurlyandskaya, Andreeva & Golovanova, 2009). Remington (2015) also came to conclusion 
that at the end of the 1990s the center became more important by using data from the Russian 
ministry of finance to show that the central government increased its share in the total 
revenues from 45% to over 60% in the period 1998 – 2010. He argued that the election of 
Putin was an important factor for this recentralization (Remington, 2015 p. 9). Zhuravskaya 
(2010) argued as well that the shift in political power in Russia was the main cause for 
recentralization, as “Boris Yeltsin’s experiments with decentralization have been recognized 
not just as unsuccessful but also as leading to the very collapse of Russia” (Zhuravskaya, 
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2010, p. 59). Vladimir Putin’s appointment can be seen as a shift away from Yeltsin’s  
unsuccessful fiscal policies.    
The most compelling explanation that is given for the recentralization of Russian taxes is a 
new tax law from 1999. This tax law was aiming to bring more power back to the 
government. The reason for this law was the economic crisis that Russia went through in 
1998. The central government would be better able to cope such a crisis the next time so it 
was given more power (Vasilev, 2000).  
 
Figure 2: Percentage of revenues collected by local governments in Russia (De Silva, 
Kurlyandskaya, Andreeva & Golovanova, 2009, p.45)  
 
          4.1.2 Trends in fiscal decentralization in China 
China started its reforming period, as well as Russia, as a highly centralized socialist state that 
was characterized by centralized revenue collections (Ma & Norregaard, 1998). In Russia, 
decentralization was mainly a political tool for Yeltsin to stay in power (Zhuravskaya, 2010, 
p. 62). Decentralization in China, however, was a more planned idea to get all the regions to 
support economic growth. Another difference between the two states is the fact that China 
went through a more regulated opening up. Where Russia opened almost overnight, China’s 
opening up was a more continuous path that is still ongoing. Because of the gradual opening 
up in China, Chinese government officials were able to test new tax policies before they were 
implemented (Harford, 2011). Ma and Norregaard (1998) argued that the goal of 
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decentralization in China was to give local governments more authority but the central 
government kept some degree of control.  
Ma and Norregaard distinguished three phases of decentralization that China went through in 
the period 1980 – 1998. The first period (1980-1984) was a dual system where the central 
government and local government were both active but ‘ate in different kitchens’. There were 
central and local taxes. The second period (1985-1988) was a period in which poor regions 
were allowed to retain more of their collected taxes. The richer provinces were imposed more 
central government control. In the last period (1988-1998) there was more diversity in 
Chinese fiscal decentralization. There were given 6 possible methods for central-provincial 
fiscal relations, each method applied on a number of provinces (Ma & Norregaard, 1999, pp. 
3-4). These methods ranged from provinces that had to pay a fixed sum every year to 
provinces that had to pay the central government payments that were depending on the growth 
rate of the province (Agarwala, 1992).  
Where the share of sub-national revenue in the central government’s budget in China was 
more fluctuant than in Russia (due to the different policies), Remington (2015) argued that it 
is around 75% of the total revenues. Shen, Jin and Zou came to approximately the same 
results by stating that the central government’s share of total revenue shifted from 40.5% to 
22% in the period 1984-1993, making the share of sub-national revenues increasing from 
59.5% to 78%. (Shen, Jin & Zou, 2012, p. 28).  Ma and Norregaard used data from the 
Chinese Statistical Bureau to show that in 1993 local government were accountable for 78% 
in local tax revenues and 72% in local expenditures (Ma & Norregaard, 1999, p. 5).  
As in Russia, a shift back to more fiscal centralization can be seen in China. This 
centralization started in 1994 when “there is introduced a new tax law, called the tax-sharing 
system (TSS) and implemented a sequence of fiscal recentralization measures” (Huang, 2012, 
p. 1). As can be seen in figure 3, there is an increase in the ratio of local fiscal revenue to 
national fiscal revenue in the period 1983-1993 as argued before. However, in 1994 there can 
be seen a clear decrease (almost 40%) in the share of local fiscal revenue. According to the 
definition from Teisman, this means that there was more revenue collection by the central 
government, meaning more fiscal centralization. The expenditure part of the fiscal policy 
continued to be mainly a responsibility for local governments.  
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Figure 3: Ratio of local fiscal revenue and expenditure in China (Lin, Tao & Liu, 2003, p. 19) 
 
4.1.3 Effects of fiscal decentralization on interregional inequality 
Song (2011) used data from several sources to measure the relation between fiscal 
decentralization and regional inequality. Following Treisman’s definition of fiscal 
decentralization, Song took revenues and expenditure into account. Song concluded that both 
revenue collection as expenditures did not converge interregional inequality but made regions 
grow further apart (Song, 2011, p. 305).  
Zhang and Zou (2001) did a comprehensive study on how fiscal decentralization has effected 
regional economic growth in China after the fall of socialism. When they used a set of varying 
data sources, they found that there is a negative correlation between real GDP growth and 
fiscal decentralization.  
Yushkov (2016) investigated the relation between fiscal decentralization and regional 
economic growth in Russia. Using data from Rosstat and the ministry of finance, he found 
that the expenditure part of fiscal decentralization negatively affected economic growth in 
Russia. These findings (a negative effect between fiscal decentralization) are supported, 
among others, by Davoodi and Zou (1997) Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer (2009) and 
Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2011).  
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As we clearly see a trend towards fiscal decentralization and later towards fiscal centralization 
in both China and Russia, I will give in this part of this paper some different views on how the 
initial fiscal decentralization process enlarged interregional inequality.  
Davoodi and Zou (1997) made some remarks on how decentralization caused interregional 
inequality in developing countries. They claimed that among other things, excessive spending 
by local governments and still existing restrictions (mainly on expenditures) from the 
government on sub-national governments are the most important causes for a lack of 
convergence.  
Another argument for fiscal decentralization influencing interregional inequality is made by 
Zhang (2006) and Slinko (2002), they claimed that fiscal decentralization goes hand in hand 
with more local government. The poorer regions which mainly rely on agricultural revenues 
in China (Zhang, 2006) or on unprofitable factories in Russia (Slinko, 2002) did not have 
much of their revenues left after paying the expensive fiscal bureaucracy. The regions that did 
not have to rely on revenues from agriculture or unprofitable factories, had some money left 
which they could use to invest in the region. Due to fiscal decentralization, some regions were 
able to grow faster than other regions.  
An additional trend that Zhang came across is the fact that when poorer regions are given 
more fiscal authority, the size of the bureaucracy in the region is growing, resulting in higher 
costs for the regions. This is according to Zhang due to the lack of other opportunities in the 
region so people in the bureaucracy will hire relatives or friends. These subsidies prevent 
local authorities from spending their revenues more efficiently (Zhang, 2006).  
Another argument for how fiscal decentralization effected interregional inequality is the fact 
that decentralization can be dangerous due to changing circumstances (Prud’homme, 1995). 
Prud’homme argued that if the economic situation changes (for example an economic crisis), 
federal governments are mostly unable to cope with these changes. This situation is applicable 
to the economic fall that Russia went through in 1998. The regions that were richer at the time 
of the crisis were in a better situation to cope with these negative effects.  
An additional argument against fiscal decentralization is the fact that officials at lower levels 
are often less competent than officials at the central level. Yushkov argued that “it is 
questionable whether subnational authorities can achieve high efficiency in the public 
production” (Yushkov, 2015, p. 2).  
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To come back to the first hypothesis: ‘Fiscal decentralization caused interregional inequality 
to grow in both China and Russia after the opening up’, I argue that fiscal decentralization did 
cause interregional inequality to grow after opening up. In both China and Russia, there was a 
clear tendency towards fiscal decentralization in the years after opening up. Fiscal 
decentralization affected interregional inequality mainly because of the high costs of fiscal 
bureaucracy that regions had to pay, causing regions that had to rely on revenues from the 
agricultural industry (in China) or unprofitable Soviet-legacy factories (in Russia) had less 
financial resources left for investing in their economy.  
4.2 Fiscal transfers 
As stated in the previous chapter, in both China as Russia a tendency towards more 
centralization can be seen. In China this was caused by tax reforms in 1994, in Russia this was 
caused by the election of Vladimir Putin as president and a tax reform in 1999. This renewed 
fiscal power in the capitals was “aimed in part at giving the central government greater 
capacity for redistribution of transfer (…) funds across regions” (Remington, 2015, p. 9).  
Fiscal transfers can be seen as a solution to the problem fiscal policy makers stumbled across 
since poorer regions were lagging behind as they had too few revenues. The difference 
between fiscal decentralization and fiscal transfers is the fact that fiscal decentralization is the 
way sub-national governments collect and spend their taxes where fiscal transfers are 
payments made by the central government towards sub-national governments.  
According to Schroeder and Smoke (2002) the goal of fiscal transfers is to bring more equity. 
This can be done by vertical (central government to local) or horizontal (rich local 
government to poor local government) payments. Bird and Smart (2002) argued that fiscal 
transfers are “how most countries achieve vertical fiscal balance, that is, ensure that the 
revenues and expenditures of each level of government are approximately equal” (Bird & 
Smart, 2002, p. 901). Bird and Smart argued that there are three possible ways for central 
governments to compensate local governments: 
- A fixed proportion of the budget every year 
- Ad hoc; the budget can change every year 
- Formula basis; local governments can get some money for specific expenditures (Bird 
& Smart, 2002, p. 2).  
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Broadway and Shah (2007) argued, summarizing an earlier article by Broadway, that next to 
the equity argument, an important argument for fiscal transfers is the influence that the central 
government gains over the local government. Central governments gain more influence over a 
local government as local governments are dependent on the central government for a part of 
its budget. Alongside that is the fact that the central government is better able to control the 
local governments budgets.  
Besides vertical transfers there are also horizontal transfers. According to Bird (1986) there is 
no clear interpretation of horizontal transfers and every country has different preferences in 
horizontal fiscal transfers. The biggest argument against horizontal, and to a lesser extent 
vertical, transfers is the disincentive that regions have to collect taxes. This disincentive 
comes from the fact that in the horizontal fiscal transfer system, “those with the highest 
expenditures and lowest taxes get the largest transfers” (Bird and Smart, 2002, pp. 901-902).  
As in this chapter the emphasis will be on central-local taxes and there is little literature about 
horizontal transfers, the stress will be on vertical fiscal transfers in China and Russia in the 
rest of the chapter. The definition that will be used in this paper for vertical fiscal transfers is: 
Payments made by the central government to local governments to ensure that the revenues 
and expenditures of every region are approximately equal (Bird and Smart, 2002, p. 901). 
4.2.1 Fiscal transfers in China 
According to the World Bank (2001), one of the reasons for the fiscal reforms in 1994 in 
China was to renew the central-local revenue sharing arrangements. (World Bank in Gan, 
Wan & Chen, 2005). In these reforms four different grants for local governments were 
created, together making up the total fiscal transfers for the Chinese central government:  
- Tax rebate (a transition arrangement) 
- Earmarked grants (grants for local governments if they imply central governmental 
policies) 
- Equalization grants (grants to equalize the regions)  
- Final account settlement grant (deals with transaction costs) (Gan, Wan & Chen, 
2005). 
 
 18 
 
In figure 4, that is composed of data from the Chinese ministry of Finance by Wan, Chen and 
Fan, it can be seen that from 1993 to 1994 there is an increase of more than 4 times the 
amount of fiscal transfers in billion RMB. After 1994 the amount of fiscal transfers continued 
to increase with almost 20% annually.  
Huang (2012) showed in his article that the share of the earmarked grants and equalization 
grants (he calls them ‘specific-purpose grants’) became more important over the years. The 
specific-purpose grants grew from 22% to over 70% of the total fiscal transfers in the period 
1995-2009. Together these specific-purpose grants were in 2009 responsible for over 1900 
billion RMB on fiscal transfers. In figure 5, one can see the latest official determination of the 
fiscal transfers in China beginning in 2011. In the figure it can be seen that the earmarked 
transfers by themselves became accountable for 42% of the total fiscal transfers. The 
equalization transfers fall in this figure under the general transfers and cover less than 20%. 
All these findings clearly point to an increase in fiscal transfers in China since 1994. 
 
Figure 4: amount of vertical fiscal transfers in China (Wan, Chen & Fan, 2005, p. 29).  
 
Figure 5: official taxation determination of Chinese fiscal transfers (Wang & Herd, 2013, 
p.18). 
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4.2.2 Fiscal transfers in Russia 
As in China, there was a tax reform in Russia after almost a decade of fiscal decentralization. 
However, in Russia there was already a system in operation for fiscal transfers in the 1990’s. 
Treisman (1996; 1998) argued that this system was not working as the fiscal agreements 
between the centre and local governments were not based on the economic situation of the 
federation but on political motives from Yeltsin, if Yeltsin economically supported a 
federation he expected political support in return. In this period the fiscal transfers were 
mostly ad-hoc and non transparent. Lavrov (1996) claimed that the centre-local relation was 
unstable as local governments were responsible for a disproportionate amount of resources.  
In the tax reform of 1999 was stated which tax revenues were part of the central budget and 
which tax revenues were part of local budgets. 
Bikalova (2001) argued that after the reforms “Revenues actually raised by regional and local 
governments account for less than 15 percent of their expenditures” (Bikalova, 2001). These 
numbers show that Russian federations became more dependent on fiscal transfers as these 
fiscal transfers compromise almost all of a federation’s budget. 
As was the case in China, in Russia there are mainly vertical transfers in place. There are 5 
types of transfers in the Russian Federation:  
- general (unconditional) grants 
- subsidies (conditional) 
- subventions (conditional)  
- grants for reforming housing  
- other transfers (Ermasova & Mikesell, 2016).  
Vartapetov (2010) claimed that the Russian fiscal transfers were aiming less at equalization 
since the beginning of 2000. In table 3, one can clearly see that the share of formula driven 
equalization transfers went down in the period 2001-2012 where the share of (conditional) 
earmarked grants went up (Vartapetov, 2010, p. 473). It must be stated that Vartapetov argued 
that according to their statements, the Russian government is planning to increase the amount 
of equalization transfers to 43% (Vartapetov, 2010, p. 473). A trend can be seen in Russia 
towards more vertical fiscal transfers but these fiscal transfers are not unconditional any more. 
Federations can use the earmarked grants only for specific expenditures.  
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Table 3: determination of fiscal transfers in Russia (Vartapetov, 2010, p.473). 
 
4.2.3 Effects of fiscal transfers on interregional inequality 
We see in both China (since 1994) and Russia (since 1999) a shift from fiscal decentralization 
towards fiscal centralization that includes more vertical fiscal transfers. To answer the second 
hypothesis ‘Fiscal transfers in China and Russia after opening up did not cause economic 
interregional convergence’ I will discuss in this part of the chapter why fiscal transfers did not 
cause economic convergence across regions in Russia and China.  
The most important argument of why fiscal transfers are not leading to convergence is given 
earlier in this chapter and is the argument that fiscal transfers do not give incentives to regions 
to stimulate good performances in both revenue collection and  economic change since they 
get the transfers they need from the central government if their own budget is not sufficient. 
This phenomenon is, among others, described by Zuravskaya (2000) and Bird and Smart 
(2002).  
Another argument of why fiscal transfers are not converging regions is made by Huang 
(2012). He argued that the Chinese tax system  in general is anti-equalizing. There are some 
equalizing elements in the tax system but the biggest part of the fiscal transfers consist of 
earmarked transfers. Huang claims that these transfers do not cause convergence as 
“earmarked transfers often require matching funds which deprive poor regions from receiving 
them” (Huang, 2012, p. 549). With only the richer regions being able to receive some of the 
earmarked transfers, interregional inequality went up.  
Vartapetov (2010) argued that in Russia, the equalization transfers had some positive 
economic effects on interregional inequality as the economic weakest federations got the 
biggest parts of these funds. The effects of the equalization transfers were measurable in 
Russia but small. Vartapetov calculated that these funds reduced the gap in inequality to only 
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9-10 times instead of 12-13 times. However, the fact that the earmarked transfers, as was the 
case in China, increased in importance in the fiscal budget and the fact that the equalization 
transfers don’t have a big impact, makes the total of the fiscal system in Russia not-
equalizing.  
Another negative effect that vertical fiscal transfers cause is the fact that the central 
governments imposes more restrictions on local governments. Since the central government 
wants local governments to use the budgets they receive in a efficient way, they will impose 
more restrictions on local governments. Rodden compared this situation with a parent who 
takes away his children’s credit cards (Rodden, 2002, p. 673). When central governments 
impose more restrictions on local governments, local governments are less able to pursue a 
growth model that fits their needs (Rodden, 2002, p. 673). 
A last reason for why fiscal decentralization did not cause convergence across regions is one 
that was not mentioned in other literature on the subject of fiscal transfers. As the biggest part 
of funds in Russia and China is not clear formula driven anymore but the funds are for the 
biggest part assigned by the central government, there will be a struggle amongst regions for 
these funds. Richer regions will possibly have better (for example, politically) sources for 
lobbying so the richer regions will receive a relatively bigger share of the funds than poorer 
regions.  
To come back to the second hypothesis, it can be stated that fiscal transfers do not have a 
converging effect on interregional inequality. In both China and Russia there was a tendency 
towards more centralization in the 1990’s. One of the features of this fiscal centralization 
were vertical fiscal transfers. These fiscal transfers do not have a converging effect on 
interregional economic inequality, mainly because of the fact that local governments had 
fewer incentives to perform well on their own as they received grants from the central 
government. Another argument of why fiscal transfers do not bring convergence is the fact 
that in both China and Russia the government increased the amount of earmarked transfers 
over time, causing the amount of, moderate converging, equalisation transfers to decrease.  
5. Discussion 
The main findings in this paper were quite surprising to me as I expected that particularly 
fiscal transfers would have a converging effect on regional inequality. This paper, however,  
showed that fiscal transfers did not have a converging effect in Russia and China. I think that 
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this paper is a fine contribution to the current literature as it is the first one to go into depth 
regarding two possible explanations for the divergence of regions in Russia and China. Next 
to that is the fact that this study is not just focusing on one case but covers both Russia and 
China. As the results for China and Russia are almost the same, comparing the two states gave 
a good overview on the effect and problems of fiscal decentralization and fiscal transfers in 
big former socialist states. 
However, there are some limitations in this paper. Firstly, it was impossible for me to get 
access to (reliable) data from the Chinese and Russian government. I tried to work around this 
problem by using research done by other authors who were able to get excess to data or 
created their own data based on empirical findings. It would give a next research on this topic 
more strength and validity if I would be able to collect data so I can prove myself that 
interregional inequality is growing in Russia and China and fiscal decentralization and fiscal 
transfers are not converging factors. Secondly, the fixed amount of words I was allowed to 
write was a limiting factor, in a next paper with a higher word limit I would be able to go  
deeper into the topic. As I was bound to a world limit, I was only able to focus on two 
institutional aspects. In a next study with more words, it would be possible to focus on more 
aspects to see if they influenced interregional inequality in China and Russia. Examples of 
other institutional aspects that are not mentioned in this paper but are worth investigating are 
intraregional tax laws and horizontal fiscal transfers. A higher word limit would also give the 
option to go deeper into the effects of the different fiscal transfers.  
Another follow up study on this topic one could investigate how China and Russia could 
organize their fiscal policies without causing interregional economic inequality. Such a study 
could compare other big federations that have a longer history of a non-planned economy and 
compare them to China and Russia.  
For the Chinese and Russian governments, it will be a difficult task to come up with a 
solution for the fiscal policies as it is shown that fiscal decentralization and fiscal 
centralization both cause interregional economic divergence when not executed thoughtfully. 
The Russian government already responded on interregional inequality this by stating that 
they are increasing the share of equalizing transfers in the total share of fiscal transfers 
(Vartapetov, 2010). Results of a tendency towards more equalizing fiscal transfers can be 
subject of a follow up study on this paper.  
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6. Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to answer the question ‘How did fiscal decentralization and fiscal 
transfers affect interregional inequality in Russia and China after opening up?’ I tried to 
answer this question by using general theories and state specific findings in recent literature. 
As the main question consists two factors, I broke down the question into two parts: fiscal 
decentralization and fiscal transfers.  
The hypothesis for fiscal transfers was that ‘Fiscal decentralization caused interregional 
inequality to grow in both China and Russia after opening up’. After identifying a trend 
towards fiscal decentralization in China after 1978 and in Russia after 1991, there were given 
explanations of why fiscal decentralization did not cause convergence. The most compelling 
argument is that fiscal decentralization gave high bureaucratic costs for the poorer regions 
leading to the fact that the poorer regions had less money left for investing in their economy. 
The second hypothesis was ‘Fiscal transfers in China and Russia after opening up did not 
cause interregional economic convergence’. The approach to this hypothesis was the same as 
the first hypothesis. Firstly, there was identified a trend towards recentralization and vertical 
fiscal transfers secondly there were given empirical findings and explanations of why these 
fiscal transfers did not cause convergence. The most compelling argument for the fact that 
fiscal transfers did not cause economic convergence across regions is that fiscal transfers do 
not give incentives for revenue collection as the regions will receive grants to cover for 
deficits in their revenue-expenditure budget. Another argument for regional divergence is the 
fact that in China and in Russia less and less of the fiscal transfers are equalization transfers. 
In China and Russia, after the tax reforms of 1994 and 1999, a trend towards more earmarked 
grants can be noticed which are only applicable to specific policies and are dependent on 
central government arbitrariness.  
To come back to the  main question of this paper, I argue that fiscal decentralization and fiscal 
transfers caused regional economic divergence as fiscal decentralization brought too high 
bureaucratic costs to the poorer regions and fiscal transfers did not bring enough incentives to 
regions to collect revenues and fiscal transfers are subject to the central governments 
arbitrariness.   
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